Current Research
"Follow the Money? How Campaign Finance Disclosures and Policy Information from Nonpartisan Experts Affect Public Opinion in Direct Democracy Settings" (with Scott A. MacKenzie) Under review.
Abstract: Citizens are typically uninformed about politics and know little about issues at stake in direct democracy elections. Government efforts to inform electorates include laws requiring campaign finance disclosures and providing policy information from nonpartisan experts. What effects do these interventions have on citizens’ opinions? We conduct survey experiments where respondents express opinions about initiatives in a real-world election. We manipulate whether they receive policy information from a nonpartisan expert, information about donors to initiative campaigns, or party cues. We find large effects for donor information, comparable to those of party cues. Policy information has more modest effects. However, uninformed citizens respond only to party cues. Our results indicate that while uninformed citizens process policy and donor information systematically, they have difficulty connecting such information to their policy interests. These results underscore the benefits of government efforts to inform electorates and highlight disparities in their effectiveness for informed and uninformed citizens.
“Party versus Principle: How Competing Parties and Frames Affect the Consistency between Citizens’ Values and Policy Views.” Under review.
Abstract: In representative democracies, political parties and candidates seek to influence public opinion by publicizing their policy positions and framing them to appeal to citizens’ values. What effects do these competing positions (i.e., party cues) and frames have on the consistency between citizens’ opinions and values? I address this question by conducting survey experiments where citizens express opinions about policies that involve a conflict between two values. I manipulate whether they receive party cues, competing frames, both, or neither type of information. I find that citizens do not blindly follow their party when its position is inconsistent with their values. Further, when their party’s inconsistent position is countered by a frame that resonates with their values, respondents follow the frame as long as it is not sponsored by the opposing party. These results identify conditions under which party cues and frames help citizens express opinions that are consistent with their values.
“Dissension in the Ranks? An Experimental Test of Rationality and Spatial Voting in Local Elections.” (with Christopher S. Elmendorf and Scott A. MacKenzie) Working paper, University of California, Davis.
Abstract: Formal theories of voter decision making assume that preferences for political candidates are rational and, therefore, can be represented by a utility function. They also frequently assume that ideology is a major factor that informs voters’ utility functions. To date, there are no studies of whether these assumptions are met in low-information local elections. We fill this gap by conducting a written exit poll during a mayoral election that asks voters to express their preferences for five leading candidates, considered pairwise. We also experimentally manipulate information shortcuts to examine their effects on voters’ preferences. We find that a large majority of voters’ preferences are rational even in this low-information context. We also show that ideology strongly influences voters’ preferences. However, political party and ethnic group endorsements weaken rather than strengthen the influence of ideology. These results indicate that most voters’ preferences satisfy the basic assumptions that formal models make and that spatial models can be usefully applied to local elections.
Abstract: Citizens are typically uninformed about politics and know little about issues at stake in direct democracy elections. Government efforts to inform electorates include laws requiring campaign finance disclosures and providing policy information from nonpartisan experts. What effects do these interventions have on citizens’ opinions? We conduct survey experiments where respondents express opinions about initiatives in a real-world election. We manipulate whether they receive policy information from a nonpartisan expert, information about donors to initiative campaigns, or party cues. We find large effects for donor information, comparable to those of party cues. Policy information has more modest effects. However, uninformed citizens respond only to party cues. Our results indicate that while uninformed citizens process policy and donor information systematically, they have difficulty connecting such information to their policy interests. These results underscore the benefits of government efforts to inform electorates and highlight disparities in their effectiveness for informed and uninformed citizens.
“Party versus Principle: How Competing Parties and Frames Affect the Consistency between Citizens’ Values and Policy Views.” Under review.
Abstract: In representative democracies, political parties and candidates seek to influence public opinion by publicizing their policy positions and framing them to appeal to citizens’ values. What effects do these competing positions (i.e., party cues) and frames have on the consistency between citizens’ opinions and values? I address this question by conducting survey experiments where citizens express opinions about policies that involve a conflict between two values. I manipulate whether they receive party cues, competing frames, both, or neither type of information. I find that citizens do not blindly follow their party when its position is inconsistent with their values. Further, when their party’s inconsistent position is countered by a frame that resonates with their values, respondents follow the frame as long as it is not sponsored by the opposing party. These results identify conditions under which party cues and frames help citizens express opinions that are consistent with their values.
“Dissension in the Ranks? An Experimental Test of Rationality and Spatial Voting in Local Elections.” (with Christopher S. Elmendorf and Scott A. MacKenzie) Working paper, University of California, Davis.
Abstract: Formal theories of voter decision making assume that preferences for political candidates are rational and, therefore, can be represented by a utility function. They also frequently assume that ideology is a major factor that informs voters’ utility functions. To date, there are no studies of whether these assumptions are met in low-information local elections. We fill this gap by conducting a written exit poll during a mayoral election that asks voters to express their preferences for five leading candidates, considered pairwise. We also experimentally manipulate information shortcuts to examine their effects on voters’ preferences. We find that a large majority of voters’ preferences are rational even in this low-information context. We also show that ideology strongly influences voters’ preferences. However, political party and ethnic group endorsements weaken rather than strengthen the influence of ideology. These results indicate that most voters’ preferences satisfy the basic assumptions that formal models make and that spatial models can be usefully applied to local elections.